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The role of the state in explaining the internationalization of emerging market enterprises 
 
Abstract 
While the competitive advantages of firms from developed economies are well understood, 
knowledge of the advantages that enable emerging market enterprises (EMEs) to expand over-
seas remains limited. Our analysis goes beyond theorizing that focused on firm resources, en-
hancing the understanding of how EMEs expand abroad by internalizing home country institu-
tional advantages that extend beyond the firm boundaries. More specifically, we examine how 
the state and institutional idiosyncrasies in the home country help EMEs internationalize. We 
demonstrate that state ownership has a strong independent effect on the international expansion 
of EMEs. This effect, however, is contingent upon firms’ own resources and other location- and 
industry-specific forces pertaining to the market orientation of each sub-national region and the 











Although globalization was for several decades driven by multinationals from developed 
countries such as the UK and the USA, emerging market enterprises (EMEs) have recently expanded 
into new markets through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). The internationalization of 
EMEs as a new phenomenon challenged the previous explanations and underlying assumptions of 
established theorizing on the subject (Wright, Filatotchev, and Hoskisson, 2005) and led to an inter-
esting puzzle: “How can firms that only rarely possess strong resources and advantages international-
ize and compete with multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries?” While prior re-
search on developed country MNEs focused on the exploitation of firm-specific assets to explain 
cross-border expansion (Buckley and Casson, 1976), EMEs differ significantly from their counter-
parts in the West. Not only do they not possess typical advantages such as technological capabilities 
and strong brand names (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Zheng, Voss and Liu, 2007; Dunning and Lundan; 
2008a), but they also operate in under-developed institutional environments in their home country. 
Because emerging economies are characterized by high levels of state ownership and weak mar-
ket-based mechanisms, the state often acts as a functional substitute for market failure, controls the 
opportunities given to EMEs and shapes their strategic choices, including internationalization. As a 
result, EMEs often need to pursue unconventional non-market strategies to exploit govern-
ment-related advantages and compensate for their weaknesses (Luo, Xue and Han, 2010; Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros and Boateng, 2012a; Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). 
The peculiar characteristics of EMEs prompt the need for a new explanation of the sources of 
competitive advantages that enable such firms to internationalize. Although the literature has 
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acknowledged that the state may assist EMEs’ international expansion (Cui and Jing, 2012; Rama-
samy, Yeung and Laforet, 2012; Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Wright, 2012b), knowledge of how and 
under what institutional circumstances such effects occur is rather limited. Indeed, the role of the state 
– which according to institutional theory may influence the objectives, priorities, resources and capa-
bilities of the firm – remains under-theorized. To increase understanding of this phenomenon, we de-
velop and test a multilevel framework, explaining why the involvement of the state in facilitating 
EME internationalization is contingent upon location-, industry- and firm-specific idiosyncrasies.  
Our study differs from and contributes to previous research in two ways. First, most research 
on internationalization implicitly assumes that there is institutional homogeneity within a given nation 
(Aguilera, 2005), i.e. although it acknowledges the existence of institutional variations across coun-
tries, it usually assumes that institutional forces remain similar across different locations and indus-
tries in a given country. By contrast, we argue that there are significant within-country institutional 
variations (Gao, Murray, Kotabe and Lu, 2010; Ma, Tong and Fitza, 2013; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005) 
and advance the premise that this important source of variation shapes EMEs’ inclination and ability 
to internationalize by affecting the environment in which strategic decisions are taken. Therefore, in-
stead of merely asking the generic question of whether the state matters, we demonstrate that EMEs’ 
internationalization is driven by location- and industry-specific institutional contexts that are not 
equally beneficial for all EMEs. This approach enables us to bring separate views on firm-, industry-, 
and sub-national region-level institutional determinants of international business (IB) within one uni-
fying framework.  
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Second, previous studies have provided insightful explanations as to how state ownership re-
sults in different advantages and therefore in overseas expansion (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008a; Ramasamy et al., 2012). Prior analyses, however, often rely on the assumption that all 
EMEs are equally able to use institutional factors to implement their international plans. We argue 
that as EMEs possess different resources and capabilities, they differ in their capacity to respond to 
institutional pressures, exploit government-related advantages and therefore vary in their ability to 
internationalize successfully. More specifically, we theorize that the effect of the state on EMEs’ in-
ternationalization is contingent upon the firms’ own technological and marketing resources. We 
therefore propose that variations in internationalization exist not only as a result of institutional forces 
and government related advantages but also because of the resources that enable the firm to respond 
to isomorphic pressures and make use of such advantages. By modeling the internal effects of institu-
tions on internationalization in this manner, we extend IB theory (e.g. Dunning, 1993) that recognizes 
that firms may derive competitive advantages from home institutions but does not specify what drives 
the firm’s ability to exploit such advantages. To test our conceptual framework, we use firm- and pro-
ject-level data for a large emerging economy (namely, China). Although we acknowledge that 
emerging economies differ from one another, we anticipate that some of the predictions of our 
framework could be adapted to other emerging economies.  
 
Theoretical background 
Home country institutions, firm resources and internationalization 
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As institutions – the political, legal, economic and social rules within countries (Scott, 1995) – 
shape an organization’s decisions, the determinants of internationalization extend beyond economic 
optimization and strategic justification (Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). An institutional 
environment can be conceptualized as a set of three pillars (Scott, 1995): regulatory (the legal system 
and its enforcement), normative (the established norms and professionalization) and cultural-cognitive 
(shared social beliefs and values). These three pillars generate isomorphic pressures that may encour-
age or constrain the behavior and actions of organizations. Hence, according to institutional theory 
(Scott, 1995), firm strategy (including internationalization) is driven not only by firm resources and 
capabilities, but also by various isomorphic pressures and the need to meet environmental demands.  
Recent advances in institutional theory challenge the deterministic view of organizations, 
emphasizing the importance of active agency over embedded institutional factors. Because firms dif-
fer in the models they adopt and in their degree of independence from institutions, they may choose to 
respond to institutional forces in different ways (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). Firms also 
co-evolve with institutions as they can exert significant influence on the institutional environment by 
managing non-market relationships (Boddewyn, 2003; Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan, 2010; Wang 
et al., 2012b). Such inter-firm variations in the effects of institutions are particularly important in 
emerging economies that experience political and institutional reforms and institutional voids (Cant-
well et al., 2010). These variations make an institutional approach particularly relevant to the analysis 
of EME internationalization (Gaur and Kumar, 2009; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
On the other hand, studies that use the resource-based view (RBV) (e.g. Peteraf, 1993) suggest 
that differences in international expansion are the result of differences in firms' resources and capabil-
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ities. According to this reasoning, foreign expansion represents a firm’s attempt either to internalize 
the use of existing resources - such as technology and brand names - in international markets (Buck-
ley and Casson, 1976; Hsu and Pereira, 2008) or to acquire new assets (Gaur and Kumar, 2009; 
Kafouros, Buckley and Clegg, 2012). RBV is a useful theoretical avenue for explaining how the 
availability and combination of resources helps firms internationalize. The RBV and the institutional 
based view can complement one another in explaining EMEs’ internationalization as differences in 
firm resources may also influence a firm’s inclination and ability to respond to regulatory, normative 
and cultural-cognitive pressures. For instance, firms with strong resources are usually more able to 
respond to such isomorphic forces (Scott, 1995), exploit government linkages (Sun, Mellahi and 
Thun, 2010), take advantage of intermediary state services and influence regulations to create favora-
ble conditions (Danneels, 2002; Luo et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012b). By contrast, firms with limited 
resources may respond to isomorphic pressures in an ad hoc manner (Winter, 2003) and may struggle 
to pursue institutional conformity. 
Hence, although state ownership can be an important institutional advantage (Wang et al., 
2012b), the ability to manage regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive pressures and benefit from 
non-market relationships depends on a firm's resources (Sun et al., 2010). Thus, variations in interna-
tionalization are a result of three things: firm resources, relationships with government and the ability 
to leverage such resources to benefit from non-market relationships. This prediction is consistent with 
established ownership-based theories of MNEs. For instance, while Dunning’s (1993) OLI paradigm 
focuses more on the firm as an economic agent and less on how it is embedded in its environment, it 
posits that ownership advantages can also be built through interacting with the firm’s home institu-
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tional environment. Dunning and Lundan (2008a; 2008b) re-conceptualized the term ‘ownership ad-
vantages’ explicitly to incorporate not only typical advantages such as technology, but also institu-
tional advantages including firm-specific norms and values and the institutional environment of the 
firm. In a similar vein, Rugman and Verbeke (1992) suggest that the international configuration of 
MNEs hinges upon home-country-specific advantages. This work implies that EMEs with weak 
firm-specific advantages may still be able to internationalize by leveraging home-country advantages. 
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
The role of the state in emerging and developed markets 
Emerging economies are countries that exhibit a high rate of economic growth and have 
started favoring economic liberalization and international openness (Arnold and Quelch, 1998, Ho-
skisson, Eden, Lau and Wright, 2000). Although the role of the state is important in both emerging 
and developed countries, for various reasons the role of government tends to be much more influential 
in emerging markets, particularly with respect to EME’s internationalization. First, while govern-
ments in developed countries keep their direct involvement in businesses at a lower level, the degree 
of state ownership in most emerging countries remains high. Second, because markets in emerging 
economies are more recently established than those in developed countries, government involvement 
is usually stronger and more influential in emerging economies, thus increasing regulatory and coer-
cive pressures (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Dunning and Narula, 1996; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and 
Wright, 2000).  
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Third, due to the limited experience, resources and capabilities of EMEs, government is often 
a key force driving EMEs’ internationalization (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). By contrast, the internationalization of firms in developed 
economies is largely a market-driven strategic choice that is not so much influenced by institutions 
and government. However, although the role of the state tends to be more important in emerging 
countries, we should also recognize that emerging countries differ from one another in terms of insti-
tutional development, market reforms and government structure. Due to these variations, the role of 
government might be more prominent in some emerging economies than in others. For instance, prior 
research suggests that government involvement is particularly prominent in large emerging economies 
such as China, India and Indonesia (Dunning and Narula, 1996).  
 
State ownership and EMEs’ internationalization  
The state can influence firm internationalization through macro-level policies and firm-level 
ownership arrangements. Governments, as the regulators of the business environment (Luo et al., 
2010), create policies that facilitate or constrain internationalization. Governments may also support 
EMEs’ internationalization through international treaties that protect OFDI (Luo et al., 2010) and in-
centives that encourage certain industries to expand overseas. For example, although the Chinese 
government promotes outward FDI in certain sectors through tax rebates, foreign exchange assistance 
and financial support, it also creates regulatory and coercive pressures using legislation to limit firm 
internationalization in other industries. Furthermore, isomorphic pressures that influence internation-
alization differ depending on the level of the government involved (e.g. state, provincial, and 
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city-level) (Wang et al., 2012b). While central government formulates regulatory frameworks to guide 
internationalization, ease capital controls and provide information and guidance on investment oppor-
tunities, governments at lower levels are responsible for implementing central government’s policies 
(Kumar and Worm, 2004) by, for example, using incentives to encourage and direct EMEs to expand 
abroad. 
Governments also influence international expansion through direct ownership in firms. Indus-
try-level forces affect most organizations in a given environment, whereas institutional pressures 
through state-ownership are specific to the firm. As a main shareholder in a firm, government impacts 
EMEs’ internationalization more directly to achieve its political, economic and social objectives. 
Since state ownership represents an important institutional attribute (Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011), 
the associated institutional pressures increase the scope for deviations from profit-maximizing objec-
tives, pushes EMEs to make decisions that are not always economically optimal and influences both 
inclination and ability of EMEs to internationalize.  
A government may affect EMEs’ inclination to internationalize by creating normative pres-
sures for SOEs to comply with the objectives of the state and gain legitimacy. As a result, managers in 
SOEs try to implement state policy and often internationalize in order to accommodate political ob-
jectives, improve geopolitical standing and ‘show the national flag’ (Deng, 2009; Wang et al., 2012b). 
Such institutional conformity is driven by normative expectations in the sense that internationalization 
may benefit SOE managers’ career and rewards. In addition, because emerging country governments 
increasingly want to integrate their nations in the global economy, the coercive and normative pres-
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sures that SOEs face increase (Peng et al., 2008). Since SOEs are particularly sensitive to such influ-
ences, state ownership plays a crucial role in affecting EMEs’ inclination to expand abroad. 
The state also influences the ability of EMEs to internationalize. The firm’s ability to imple-
ment new strategic initiatives, such as internationalization, depends on its access to new and comple-
mentary assets and resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Because the market for critical inputs in 
emerging economies is underdeveloped, state ownership comes with advantages (e.g. stronger protec-
tion of property rights, better public provision, insider information and control over important assets) 
that help EMEs offset ownership disadvantages in foreign markets (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008a). In contrast, non-SOEs are less likely to access these advantages 
through non-market channels and therefore have to rely on internal resources to internationalize (Nee, 
1992). 
Therefore, as state ownership positively influences both the inclination and ability of EMEs to 
expand abroad, firms with a higher degree of state ownership are more likely to expand overseas. 
Nevertheless, because the involvement of the state is not equally beneficial to all firms (Peng and 
Luo, 2000), a contingency analysis is required to capture such variations. Although we expect state 
ownership, firm-specific resources and other institutional factors to influence OFDI independently, we 
further hypothesize that the effects of state ownership on international expansion are not uniform 
across EMEs but rather depend upon the EME’s own resources and other location- and indus-
try-specific institutional idiosyncrasies (Figure 1). We accordingly develop a number of hypotheses. 




Location-specific institutional variations: The role of marketization 
Marketization refers to the extent to which a business environment is driven by market forces 
and firms, rather than the state and government. Hence, a higher degree of marketization implies that 
the role of government involvement is less influential. In contrast to the typical view that institutions 
within a given nation are similar, emerging countries exhibit significant cross-regional variations in 
the extent to which the state is involved in the coordination of economic actors. In regions with 
well-established institutions, markets function well and interruptions from governments are minimal. 
Hence, uncertainty and transaction costs are lower than they are in regions with a lower level of mar-
ketization. These variations are particularly significant in countries such as China which are changing 
their structure from a centrally planned economy to a market economy (Luk, Yau, Sin, Tse, Chow and 
Lee, 2008). As a result, the transition process in these countries is spatially uneven (He, Wei and Xie, 
2008). While some regions exhibit the characteristics of a command economy (i.e. the state has con-
trol over the market and owns many organizations), non-market influences and state interventions are 
less common in market-oriented regions. Indeed, extant research suggests that regions within China 
differ in the pace and extent of market reforms (Wei and Hao, 2010). For instance, local governments 
in the coastal provinces of China (which are more market oriented than inland provinces) intervene 
less frequently in firms’ decisions (NERI, 2001). 
Accordingly, the relationship between state ownership and foreign investment varies signifi-
cantly across regions. In regions where the degree of marketization is higher, firms resemble their 
counterparts from developed economies. The coercive pressure that they receive from government is 
lower. They also rely on the principles of a market economy and take advantage of markets for coor-
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dinating factors for internationalization. As the institutional context evolves and becomes market ori-
ented, firms move from institution-based strategies to resource-based strategies (Hoskisson et al., 
2000). We therefore expect internationalization to be largely driven by the firm itself rather than by 
government involvement. Because of market reforms and improved governance, SOEs in these re-
gions are likely to become ‘market’ oriented and organize themselves around incentive-based struc-
tures that promote performance. By contrast, regions with a lower level of marketization are more 
likely to have under-developed institutions, which reduce competitive and imitative pressures (Chacar 
and Vissa, 2005). Firms in such regions are significantly influenced by regulatory forces and are 
therefore keen to build connections with government. Government officials may be particularly in-
fluential and may even coerce firms to align their goals with government interests. Government may 
use its power to implement objectives, including globalization, through means such as direct provision 
of critical resources and subsidies to support internationalization. In these cases, internationalization is 
likely to be institutionally embedded and supported by the regulatory and normative pillars of the in-
stitutional environment. Overall, we expect the degree of marketization in a region to moderate nega-
tively the effects of state ownership on a firm’s overseas investment: 
H1: The effects of state ownership on the level of overseas investment will be weaker in 
sub-national regions with a higher degree of marketization than in sub-national regions with a 
lower degree of marketization.  
 
Institutional variations across industries  
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Because each industry is coordinated by a unique configuration of institutional arrangements 
(Hollingsworth, 2000), there are significant institutional variations across industries. Industries in 
emerging economies vary considerably in their nature and the amount of support that they receive 
from the state. OFDI is encouraged and subsidized in some industries, but it is not a priority for gov-
ernment in other sectors. We hypothesize that such variations are an important source of different 
competitive advantages that may result in contrasting internationalization outcomes. We thus expect 
the relationship between state ownership and overseas investment to vary across sectors. In industries 
where governments do not place emphasis on internationalization, political interests, normative forces 
and institutional policies on OFDI are not always consistent with the decision of the SOE to invest 
overseas. These coercive pressures may lead to conflicts between managers and government officials 
and may change the firm’s internationalization plans - particularly in SOEs where direct government 
involvement is high.  
By contrast, state ownership will have a strong positive effect on overseas investment for 
firms that operate in sectors where global integration is a priority. Firms and SOEs in these industries 
respond to coercive and normative pressures and gain legitimacy by implementing their international 
strategies because such objectives are compatible with those of government (Oliver, 1997). This may 
lead to synergistic effects between institutional policies and firms’ strategic planning. The process of 
getting government approval for OFDI projects is likely to be easier and less time consuming in those 
industries. Hence, higher levels of state ownership will enable such firms to benefit disproportionately 
from institutional policy and from industry-specific initiatives that support overseas expansion (Luo et 
al., 2010). Overall, although government will only rarely block firms’ foreign investment entirely, we 
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hypothesize that the positive relationship between state ownership and internationalization will be 
stronger in sectors where OFDI is a priority:  
H2: The effects of state ownership on the level of overseas investment will be stronger in 
firms that operate in industries where OFDI is encouraged by government than in firms that 
operate in other industries. 
 
 The moderating role of technological and marketing resources 
Furthermore, the effects of state ownership on OFDI vary across firms, depending on the 
firms' technological and marketing resources. Technological resources refer to the assets used to de-
velop new products and innovative processes (Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999), while marketing re-
sources are those which help firms differentiate their products from competitors, build brand names 
(Erramilli, Agarwal and Kim, 1997; Kotabe, Srinivasan and Aulakh, 2002) and better position them-
selves in the product value chain. Both types of resources facilitate EMEs’ internationalization be-
cause they involve high levels of specificity (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). R&D, for instance, enables 
firms to create ambiguity and barriers to imitation (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990), develop innovative 
technologies to differentiate themselves from international rivals (Kafouros and Buckley, 2008) and 
introduce a steady stream of new products (Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv, 1999). Similarly, marketing 
resources encourage internationalization by enabling firms to market their products abroad,  enhance 
their bargaining power with suppliers (Kotabe et al., 2002), and influence foreign customers’ choice 
behavior (Dutta et al., 1999). 
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The state may complement the firm’s innovation efforts by improving framework conditions 
and by providing critical resources (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). As SOEs are closely associated with 
government, they have access to public R&D, patents and other government-controlled intangible as-
sets not available to other companies (Wang et al., 2012b). These can in turn help firms develop dis-
tinctive structures, respond to isomorphic pressures more effectively (Scott, 1995) and accelerate the 
organizational learning needed to compete in international markets. Furthermore, the level of intel-
lectual property protection depends on the status of the firm, which means that regulatory pressures 
also differ across firms (Li, Park and Li, 2004). State owned firms are well protected by government, 
capturing the value of innovation. The state also helps EMEs acquire scientific talent and technology 
from foreign MNEs (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas and Svobodina, 2004). Yet, not all firms can ex-
ploit these institutional advantages equally. We argue that this ability is a function of the firm’s own 
technological resources. Although SOEs can access intermediary state services (Khanna, Palepu and 
Sinha, 2005), the exploitation of these benefits depends upon firms’ own R&D because this enhances 
the ability to identify external technology providers and successfully internalize the knowledge that 
government agencies and public research institutes can provide.  
Marketing activities such as international market research and contract protection involve 
high risk and uncertainty (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The state can reduce such risks by bringing 
EMEs in contact with foreign institutions and investors and by reducing the cost of market research 
(Malik and Kotabe, 2009). It can also provide information about consumer preferences (Moorman and 
Slotegraaf, 1999) and facilitate channel relationships that may create barriers to entry. SOEs can fur-
ther reduce the cost of marketing by accessing intelligence that the state collects regarding foreign 
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opportunities and product attributes (Khanna et al., 2005). EMEs can therefore increase their under-
standing of foreign consumers’ preferences and reduce the uncertainty associated with foreign mar-
kets. However, to benefit from such government-endowed marketing resources and intelligence, firms 
must possess complementary marketing resources (Morgan, Vorhies and Mason, 2009). Such re-
sources enable firms to react to the coercive and normative pressures of internationalization, and help 
them integrate such strategic ingredients with other internal resources or institutional advantages in 
ways that enhance their international competitiveness (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993). By contrast, these 
benefits will be less useful for firms that possess weak marketing resources. These firms are less able 
to change and take full advantage of intermediary services, information and other resources provided 
by governments. Hence:  
H3: The effects of state ownership on the level of overseas investment will be stronger for 
firms with greater (a) technological and (b) marketing resources than for firms with weaker 
resources.  
 
Data and methods 
Empirical Setting and Data 
We test our conceptual framework using a sample of Chinese manufacturing and mining firms. Start-
ing from virtually no outward FDI in 1979, China is now an important contributor to the world’s 
OFDI. Chinese OFDI achieved an average growth rate of 48.94% during our sample period 
(2005-2007). This growth in OFDI concurred with a transition from a centrally-planned economy to a 
market-based system. Although institutional changes have dismantled many barriers to business oper-
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ations during this transition, the state is still crucial in shaping business in China and the behavior of 
firms. This is evidenced by the fact that SOEs accounted for 82% of Chinese OFDI in 2006 (Yeung 
and Liu, 2008). Furthermore, China features considerable cross-region and cross-industry institutional 
differences, allowing us to examine the ways in which within-country variations impact the effects of 
state ownership on internationalization. China therefore offers an appropriate setting for examining 
whether and under what conditions the state and institutional forces influence OFDI. 
Our sample contains 626 Chinese firms including 615 manufacturing firms and 11 mining 
firms. The data are obtained from two sources. Information on firms’ outward investment was ob-
tained from the Ministry of Commerce of China (MCC). Due to a legacy of institutional dependence, 
OFDI projects by Chinese firms are still subject to governmental approval (Child and Rodrigues, 
2005). The Chinese government wants to ensure that such investments are in line with its resource 
allocation plans and priorities (Child and Lu, 1996), and to reinforce China’s global influence (Luo et 
al., 2010). The need for approval is also important because capital accounts are not fully open for free 
trade in China, meaning that the Chinese government monitors all foreign exchange outflows. All 
firms that have invested overseas are also required to report data to their corresponding provincial 
Bureau of Commerce1. These data are then reported to the MCC, which has collected such data since 
2006. The database provides information on all Chinese firms’ OFDI in 2006 and 2007 – a period in 
which China’s outward FDI achieved significant growth. The MCC dataset provides a wide variety of 
information, including the name of the parent firm and its foreign subsidiaries, the host country, the 
total capital of the project and the capital invested by Chinese firms2. 
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All other data are obtained from Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES) 
compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Chinese law requires all firms to submit 
financial information to the NBS. This dataset provides a wide variety of information on firm owner-
ship structure, group affiliation, industry affiliation, geographic location, establishment year, em-
ployment, assets, R&D, advertising, value-added, sales, new product sales and exports for all manu-
facturing industries. The use of this multi-industry sample increases both variance and the number of 
observations. The ARIES is a comprehensive firm-level dataset, accounting for about 90% of total 
output in most industries.  
Matching the MCC and ARIES databases produces a sample of 676 projects. We added the 
value of all projects together for firms that had invested in both years (43 firms in total). This produc-
es a sample of 633 firms. After dropping 4 firms for missing observations and 3 outlier firms, we have 
ended up with a final sample of 626 firms for which there is a complete set of information about the 
empirical variables. To construct our dependent variables, we use data for 2006-2007. Our independ-
ent variables are lagged by one year and therefore are based on data for 2005-2006. Our sample ex-
cluded small investors with annual turnover of less than five million Renminbi (approximate US 






Following many previous studies (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2012b) and for its 
ease of comparison, we used the actual amount of annual overseas investment undertaken by each 
firm to measure foreign investment.  
 
Independent variable and moderators 
The key predictor variable, state ownership, is measured as the share of state-owned paid-in 
capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm. We include four variables that we hypothesize may 
moderate the effects of state ownership. First, a measure of region-specific marketization takes into 
account the fact that the effects of state ownership may vary across regions depending on the devel-
opment of market-based mechanisms. This measure, developed by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2006) is a 
comprehensive composite index that evaluates a province’s policies and institutions regarding eco-
nomic freedom in five key areas, including the role of market relative to government, the development 
of the private sector, the development of commodity and factor markets and the development of free 
market institutions3. Twenty-four indicators are employed to assess these five dimensions and esti-
mate a marketization index. The values of the marketization index, according to Fan et al. (2006), 
range from 2.89 (Tibet) to 11.80 (Shanghai). The higher the value of marketization, the more devel-
oped the market-based system in a region.  
Second, the Chinese government strongly encourages OFDI in some industries. Firms in the 
‘encouraged’ group of industries receive more institutional support and incentives than their counter-
parts in sectors where OFDI is not a priority. To capture such inter-industry differences in our Indus-
try-specific policy, we constructed a dummy variable that distinguishes between the two groups of 
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industries (it equals 1 if the firm operates in an ‘encouraged’ industry). These industry data were col-
lected from the official document jointly issued by several Chinese government agencies under the 
State Council4. Finally, building on prior studies (e.g. Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan and McCullough, 
2007), technological and marketing resources are captured by R&D expenditures per employee, and 
marketing expenditures per employee, respectively (Dutta et al., 1999; Erramilli et al., 1997; Gat-
ignon and Anderson, 1988; Tseng et al., 2007; Wang et al. 2012b). As these operationalizations re-
flect the actual investment made in R&D and marketing, they directly capture the R&D and marketing 
resources of each firm. By dividing R&D and marketing expenditure by the firm’s number of em-
ployees, we normalize the measures for firm size. 
 
Control Variables 
Since differences in size may influence the hypothesized effects (Yiu, Lau and Bruton, 2007), 
we use the logarithm of the number of employees to control for firm size and skew (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). Second, we control for the effects of firm experience by including a measure of firm 
age, using the number of years since the establishment of the organization. Third, group affiliation is 
captured by a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group) (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000)5. Fourth, foreign ownership may stimulate a firm’s internationalization due to knowledge spill-
overs. We control for foreign ownership using the ratio of paid-in capital owned by foreign investors 
to total paid-in capital. Fifth, exporting often represents the initial stage of internationalization and 
provides valuable information about new markets. We use the ratio of export sales to total sales to 
control for export intensity. Our model also controls for human resources by measuring each firm’s 
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training expenditure per employee. Finally, we introduce dummy variables to account for unobserved 
industry- and time-specific effects.  
 
Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. All correlations are fairly low, and the average value of 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is well below the acceptable level of 10 (Neter, Wasserman and 
Kutner, 1985), suggesting that there is no serious multicollinearity problem. Nevertheless, we 
mean-centered the interaction terms to avoid any potential problems of multicollinearity and increase 
the interpretability of interactions (Aiken and West, 1991). Since a firm’s actions may take some time 
to influence OFDI, we lagged all independent variables by one year. To deal with possible heteroske-
dasticity, we estimated OLS regressions using Huber-White’s robust standard error (White, 1980). 
Table 2 reports the results of our hierarchical OLS regression.  
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
Model 1 serves as a baseline model that includes only control variables. Firm resources are 
introduced in Model 2. The effects of both resource variables on OFDI are statistically insignificant. 
Whilst these results contradict conventional wisdom that predicts that firms need to possess intangible 
resources to conduct FDI, they support the view that firm-specific resources are not always important 
for the internationalization of EMEs (Wang et al., 2012a; Yiu et al., 2007). Model 3 incorporates the 
three institutional variables. Two of them (state ownership and industry-specific policies) are statisti-
cally significant, supporting the view that home-country institutional forces, in particular government 
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involvement, lay the foundations for the international expansion of Chinese firms (Deng, 2009; Luo et 
al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012b). 
Models 4-7 present the results for hypotheses H1-H3. Following the usual practice in moder-
ated regression analysis, we enter two-way interactions in these models successively. Model 4 shows 
that the coefficient of the interaction term between state ownership and location-specific marketiza-
tion is negative and statistically significant, providing support for H1. Similarly, as the interaction 
term between state ownership and industry-specific policy (Model 5) is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, H2 is corroborated. The interaction term between state ownership and technological re-
sources in Model 6 is insignificant, while that between state ownership and marketing resources is 
significant (Model 7). Therefore, H2a is not supported, whilst H2b is corroborated. To explain better 
the moderating effects of government involvement, these relationships are presented in Figure 2. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
Robustness Checks 
The possibility that OFDI affects some firm characteristics is less likely as most Chinese 
OFDI projects have started only recently. Nevertheless, some explanatory variables (e.g. state owner-
ship, technological and marketing resources) may be influenced by OFDI, causing potential problems 
of reverse causality. We reduce such concerns by incorporating several variables that account for firm 
characteristics as thoroughly as possible. We also implement a lag structure for independent variables. 
However, despite these measures, the obtained estimates may still lack some of the required proper-
ties. Therefore, we employ the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to examine the possibility of simulta-
neity between explanatory variables and OFDI. 
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We conduct the Hausman test using instrumental variables (IV). Following standard practice 
(Gujarati, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009), we use lagged variables for technological resources, marketing 
resources and state ownership as IVs. We are able to trace back firms from our sample that were op-
erating in 2004 from the China Economic Census6. The combination of our data with information 
from the China Economic Census in 2004 creates a sample of 516 firms. We use this data to test the 
exclusion restriction that each instrumental variable does not affect the dependent variable through 
channels other than the suspected endogenous variables. This is done by  regressing the residuals 
from the second-stage estimations on the IVs. If the IVs affect the key variables through other mecha-
nisms, the residuals from the second-stage estimations will be correlated with the IVs (Lu and Tao, 
2009). 
Table 3 displays the results. As all the estimated effects on IVs are statistically insignificant, 
the instrumental variables are indeed orthogonal to the error term. To examine whether the suspected 
variables are endogenous, we conduct a Hausman test and compare the OLS and 2SLS estimates. Re-
sults show that the value of Chi-square is 0.06 (degrees of freedom=10), much lower than the critical 
value of 15.99 at 10 percent significance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the differences in 
OLS and 2SLS estimated coefficients are not systematic is not rejected, suggesting that key variables 
should jointly be treated as exogenous, and that using OLS is well justified. Further, we include a full 
model (Model 8 in Table 2) that includes all the interaction terms simultaneously, indicating that the 
results for these interactions remain qualitatively the same. 




Although it is widely accepted that EMEs differ significantly from their counterparts from 
developed economies, knowledge of whether and how they build competitive advantages and succeed 
in internationalizing their operations remains incomplete. Because foreign investment from emerging 
markets has both economic and institutional dimensions (Child and Rodrigues, 2005), scholars have 
questioned the ability of previous theories to explain the international expansion of firms from 
emerging economies. Extant research recognizes the role of the state in EMEs’ internationalization 
(e.g. Buckley et al., 2007), but implicitly assumes that the impact of the state is similar across the dif-
ferent locations and industries of a given country. We challenge this assumption by demonstrating that 
institutional forces and the internationalization effects of state ownership are contingent upon loca-
tion- and industry-specific idiosyncrasies. Our empirical analysis points to the role of the state in un-
locking EMEs’ potential for international expansion. More importantly, it further shows that state 
ownership is not equally beneficial for all EMEs, but rather dependent on the firm’s own technologi-
cal and marketing resources. Our findings have several theoretical and managerial implications.  
First, unlike studies that presume that there is institutional homogeneity within a given coun-
try (e.g. Aguilera, 2005), we advance the premise that institutions vary across different locations in 
the same country. A theoretical implication is that location-specific institutional variations change the 
role that emerging country governments play in stimulating foreign investment. It also shows that 
examining institutions at the country-level without considering within-country cross-regional differ-
ences may underestimate the power of these differences in explaining variations in cross-border ex-
pansion. In contrast to the notion that marketization, due to lower agency costs, may strengthen the 
relationship between government involvement and firm internationalization, our findings indicate that 
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this relationship is stronger in regions with a lower degree of marketization than in regions with a 
higher degree of marketization. This counter-intuitive finding indicates that as regions evolve and be-
come market oriented, OFDI is largely driven by the firm itself and its resources, rather than by the 
state. Although IB scholars recognize the importance of within-country differences in regional en-
dowments, an understanding of how subnational institutional effects influence variations in foreign 
investment remains limited. Our findings regarding the sub-national region-specific institutional ef-
fects on foreign investment complement and advance the strategic management and international 
business literature by showing the sub-national region to be an important unit of analysis. Hence, 
while these effects are typically described in international business theory as “host-country” institu-
tions, our findings indicate that they are in fact sub-national region-specific effects that manifest 
themselves in different ways within the same country. 
Second, we find that the effect of state ownership in enhancing foreign expansion is stronger 
in industries where internationalization is a strategic priority for the state. This finding suggests that 
state ownership may not have an independent and homogeneous influence on internationalization 
across subnational regions. This finding is intriguing, indicating that while firms in a given country 
face the same macro-level institutions (Scott, 1995), these macro-level forces are not capable of dif-
ferentiating firms’ competitive advantages. By contrast, our findings suggest that EMEs derive con-
trasting international competitive advantages from different industry-specific institutional contexts. 
Indeed, although emerging market governments have recently adopted a favorable attitude towards 
OFDI, policy is often implemented at the industry level. This leads to significant variations in regula-
tory, normative and cognitive institutional settings that either facilitate or impede firms’ international 
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plans and strategic choices. Together with the findings of the region-specific effects, our research has 
theoretical implications with regard to how an organizational field should be defined and how EMEs 
succeed in internationalizing by exploiting region- and industry-specific institutional advantages.  
Third, our study contributes to institutional explanations of internationalization by showing 
that only firms with strong marketing resources can exploit certain institutional advantages associated 
with state ownership. Although marketing resources have an insignificant independent effect on 
OFDI, they play an important role under the presence of state ownership. Thus, the implication here is 
that the ability of government to stimulate international expansion is dependent upon firms’ own re-
sources. Our findings concerning the significant interaction between marketing resources and state 
ownership suggest that taking advantage of institutional factors depends on the brand name and image 
that the firm develops. In contrast, it appears that technological resources do not help EMEs build 
competitive advantages and internationalize. Firms often deploy resources in ways consistent with 
market forces (Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). The value of these resources depends on how difficult 
it is for rivals to copy and obtain them from the market (Krasnikov and Jayachandran, 2008). Due to 
its socially complex nature, marketing knowledge is more difficult to codify than technological capa-
bilities (Simonin, 1999). Because capabilities based on easily codified processes may not afford an 
organization the ability to achieve competitive advantage (Krasnikov and Jayachandran, 2008), tech-
nological resources have a weaker effect on EMEs’ competitive advantages than marketing resources. 
Another explanation for this result is that EMEs have a good understanding of their home market and 
customers, but have not yet developed strong technological resources as they largely focus on stand-
ardized products (Buckley, Clegg and Wang, 2007). 
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Taken together, our findings suggest that traditional theoretical frameworks that rest upon the 
advantages that MNEs develop within their organizational boundaries should be augmented to include 
advantages derived from home institutional environments. In this respect, we extend prior theorizing 
that views government involvement as a functional substitute for market failure by showing that the 
state can indeed be an important source of competitive advantages that help EMEs compete in inter-
national markets. By conceptualizing the state as an endogenous part of the firm, the development of 
relationships with government emerges as an important component of firms’ strategy. Recognizing 
that EMEs internationalize in a dynamic manner (Yaprak and Karademir, 2010) and are influenced by 
multiple institutional forces, our analysis suggests that the value-creating potential of state ownership 
largely depends on the moderating role of various institutional parameters. This view differs from 
prior studies that either focus on organizations or institutions, rather than the interaction between the 
two (Coriat and Weistein, 2002), or conceptualize internal and institutionally-derived capabilities as 
two separate and independent types of advantages. Our study therefore shifts the debate from whether 
state ownership and institutions matter for internationalization to the question of how and under what 
conditions they can be used to develop competitive advantages. 
 
Implications for managers and policy makers 
Our findings have implications for EME managers seeking to expand their firms overseas. 
First, rather than merely focusing on the accumulation and development of traditional firm resources, 
EMEs should carefully develop a strategic plan and capabilities that will assist firms in managing in-
stitutional idiosyncrasies and exploiting external factors, institutional contexts and inputs controlled 
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by the government. Such capabilities may enable EMEs to internationalize even if they do not yet 
possess the type of resources (e.g. technological assets) that MNEs from developed countries possess. 
This recommendation differs from the conventional theory of MNEs that suggests that the develop-
ment of firm-specific competitive advantages is a necessary and sufficient condition for firms to em-
bark on internationalization. Furthermore, the institutional environment is not always exogenously 
determined and fixed, but can be shaped by firms (Luo et al., 2010). Hence, rather than merely react-
ing to institutional pressures, EMEs should be proactive, internalize government-related advantages 
and influence institutions in a way that will help their internationalization.  
Second, the location choices of the EME and the industry in which it operates may impact its 
ability to benefit from government involvement. EMEs that establish their operations in regions where 
the degree of marketization is lower and compete in industries that are encouraged to internationalize 
are better able to exploit state-related advantages. Nevertheless, although our findings emphasize the 
value of state ownership, they do not necessarily suggest that managers should place less emphasis on 
the development of the firm’s own resources. Government involvement in the form of state ownership 
may lock firms in a particular institutional context that will not assist the development of new capabil-
ities. To overcome this challenge, EMEs must balance the two strategies, be ambidextrous and devel-
op both conventional (internal) resources and capabilities that will enable them to exploit their rela-
tionships with the state (Wang et al., 2012b). Indeed, a business model that rests upon the combina-




Our findings also have implications for policy. Policy makers in emerging economies expect 
internationalization to strengthen the global competitiveness of their firms and country. Our findings 
show that although government can achieve this objective by intervening through state ownership, 
this practice should not be used as a uniform policy to encourage internationalization. This policy 
should be adopted only in industries in which OFDI is encouraged by government and in sub-national 
regions where market mechanisms are less developed. State ownership is unlikely to have a similar 
effect on internationalization in other industries and regions. Furthermore, as firm-specific resources 
(i.e. marketing resources) enable EMEs to exploit government related advantages, policies that en-
courage firms to develop such resources will facilitate the role of state ownership. 
However, policy makers also have to be aware that what is good for internationalization is not 
necessarily beneficial for firm growth and the national economy. For example, although 
well-developed market mechanisms may reduce the level of state ownership, they are important con-
ditions for increasing firm capabilities, competitiveness and long-term economic growth. Therefore, 
although state ownership may facilitate EMEs’ internationalization, it should be considered as a tem-
porary policy choice that works in the particular situations of emerging economies.  
 
Limitations and Future Research  
When interpreting the above results, a number of limitations should be considered. First, 
while prior research has shown that government involvement is particularly important in emerging 
economies such as India, China, Indonesia and Brazil (Dunning and Narula, 1996; WIR, 2008), our 
empirical data rely on one country. Although this approach made it possible to control for region- and 
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industry-specific institutional characteristics, our findings may not be equally generalizable to other 
emerging countries because of various China-specific idiosyncratic characteristics, including the 
strong role of the state. As market forces and government interventions vary from country to country 
(Mahmood and Rufin, 2005), the ability to generalize our framework and predictions depends on the 
level of market and institutional development of the country in question as well as on the extent to 
which institutional differences persist across regions and industries. Hence, a useful avenue for future 
research will be to explore whether our hypothesized relationships hold true in other emerging econ-
omies. Second, the degree of globalization varies between industries, implying that the forces driving 
internationalization may differ in manufacturing and service sectors. However, data limitations did 
not allow us to test this proposition and compare how the findings differ between these two sectors. A 
final concern is the potential endogeneity that can typically be found in this type of research. For in-
stance, while the deployment of resources may lead to OFDI, international expansion may in turn fa-
cilitate the accumulation of new resources. Although our robustness analysis suggests that this con-
cern is less important for our dataset, future research should employ longitudinal data and consider the 











Aggarwal, K. and T. Agmon (1990). ‘The international success of developing country firms: Role of 
government directed advantage’, Management International Review, 30, pp: 163–180. 
Aguilera, R.A. (2005). ‘Corporate governance and director accountability: an institutional compara-
tive perspective’, British Journal of Management, 16, pp: S39-S53. 
Aiken, L.S. and S.G. West (1991). Multiple regression: testing and interpreting interactions. Sage: 
Newbury Park CA. 
Amit, R. and P.J.H. Schoemaker (1993). ‘Strategic assets and organizational rent’, Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 14, pp: 33–46.  
Arnold, D.J. and J.A. Quelch (1998). New Strategies in Emerging Markets. Sloan Management Re-
view, 40, pp: 7-20.  
Boddewyn, J. J. (2003). ‘Understanding and advancing the concept of ‘‘nonmarket’, Business & Soci-
ety, 42, pp: 297–327. 
Buckley, P.J. and M.C. Casson (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise. Homes & Meier: 
London.  
Buckley, P. J., J. Clegg, A. Cross, P. Zheng, , H. Voss and X. Liu (2007). ‘The determinants of Chi-
nese outward foreign direct investment’, Journal of International Business Studies, 38, pp: 499–518.  
Buckley, P., J. Clegg and C. Wang (2007). ‘The impact of FDI on the performance of Chinese manu-
facturing Firms’, Journal of International Business Studies, 33, pp: 637-655 
32 
 
Cantwell, J., J. H. Dunning and S. M. Lundan (2010). ‘An  evolutionary  approach  to  under-
standing  international  business  activity:  the  co-evolution  of  MNEs  and  the  institu-
tional  environment’, Journal  of  International  Business  Studies,  41, pp: 567-586. 
Chacar, A. and B. Vissa (2005). ‘Are emerging economies less efficient? Performance persistence and 
the impact of business group affiliation’, Strategic Management Journal, 26, pp: 933–946. 
Child, J. & Y. Lu (1996). ‘Institutional constraints on economic reform: the case of investment deci-
sions in China’, Organization science, 7, pp: 60-67. 
Child, J. and S. B. Rodrigues (2005). ‘The internationalization of Chinese firms: A case for theoretical 
extension?’ Management and Organization Review, 1, pp: 381–418.  
Coriat, B. and F. Orsi (2002). ‘Establishing a new Regime of Intellectual Property Rights in the Unit-
ed States. Origins, Content and Problems’, Research Policy, 31, pp: 1491–1507. 
Cui, L. and F. Jiang (2012). ‘State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions under institu-
tional pressure: A study of Chinese outward-investing firms’, Journal of International Business Stud-
ies, 43, pp: 264–284. 
Danneels, E. (2002), ‘The Dynamics of Product Innovation and Firm Competences’, Strategic Man-
agement Journal, 23, pp: 1095–1121. 
Deng, P. (2009). ‘Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international expansion?’ 
Journal of World Business, 44, pp: 74–84. 
Dierick, I. and K. Cool (1989). ‘Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive ad-
vantage’, Management Science, 35, pp: 1504–1511. 
33 
 
Du, J., Y, Lu and Z. Tao (2008). ‘Economic institutions and FDI location choice: Evidence from US 
multinationals in China’. Journal of Comparative Economics’, 36, pp: 412-429. 
Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational enterprises and the global economy, Wokingham: Addi-
son-Wesley.  
Dunning, J. H. and S. M. Lundan (2008a). ‘Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the multinational 
enterprise’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25, pp: 573–593. 
Dunning, J. H. and S. M. Lundan (2008b). Multinational enterprises and the global economy, (2nd 
ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Dunning, J.H. and R. Narula (1996), ‘The investment development path revisited: some emerging 
issues’, in J.H. Dunning and R. Narula (eds.) Foreign direct investment and governments, London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-41. 
Dutta, S., Narasimhan, O.and Rajiv, S. (1999). ‘Success in High-Technology Markets: Is Marketing 
Capability Critical?’ Marketing Science, 18, pp: 547-568. 
Erramilli, M. K., S. Agarwal and S. S. Kim (1997). ‘Are firm-specific advantages location-specific 
too?’, Journal of International Business Studies, 28, pp: 735–757.  
Fan, G., X. L. Wang and H. P. Zhu (2006). The report on the relative process of marketization of each 
region in China. Economic Science Publishing House, Beijing. 
Firth, M., C, Lin., P. Liu and S. M. L. Wong (2009). ‘Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in 
China’s private sector’. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, pp: 1144-1155. 
34 
 
Gao, G. Y., Murray, J. Y., Kotabe, M., and J. Lu (2010). ‘A “strategy tripod” perspective on export 
behaviors: Evidence from domestic and foreign firms based in an emerging economy’, Journal of In-
ternational Business Studies, 41, pp: 377–396. 
Gatignon, H. and E. Anderson (1988). ‘The multinational corporation’s degrees of control over for-
eign subsidiaries: an empirical test of a transaction cost explanation’, Journal of Law Economics and 
Organization, 4, pp: 305-336.  
Gaur, A.S. and V. Kumar (2009). ‘International Diversification, Business Group Affiliation and Firm 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from India’, British Journal of Management, 20, pp: 172-186.  
Gujarati, D.N. (2009). Basic econometrics. The 5th Edition, McGraw-Hill. 
Gulati, R., N. Nohria and A. Zaheer (2000). ‘Strategic networks’, Strategic Management Journal, 
Special Issue, 21, pp: 203–215.  
Hausman, J.A. (1978). ‘Specification tests in econometrics’, Econometrics, 46, pp: 1251–1271.  
He, C., D. W. Wei and X. Xie (2008). ‘Globalization, institutional change, and industrial location: 
economic transition and industrial concentration in China’, Regional Studies, 42, pp: 1–23. 
Hitt, M. A., D. Ahlstrom, M. T. Dacin, E. Levitas and L. Svobodina (2004). ‘The institutional effects 
on strategic alliance partner selection in transition economies: China vs. Russia’, Organization Sci-
ence, 15, pp: 173-185.  
Hollingsworth, J.R. (2000). ‘Doing institutional analysis: implications for the study of Innovations’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 7, pp: 595–644. 
Hoskisson, R.E., L, Eden, and C.M. Lau and M. Wright (2000). ‘Strategy in emerging economies’, 
Academy of Management Journal, 43, pp: 249-267. 
35 
 
Hsu, C. C. and A. Pereira (2008). ‘Internationalization and performance: The moderating effects of 
organizational learning, Omega, 36, pp: 188-205. 
Kafouros, M. I. and P. J. Buckley (2008). ‘Under what conditions do firms benefit from the research 
efforts of other organizations?’ Research Policy, 37, pp: 225–239. 
Kafouros M.I., P.J. Buckley and L.J. Clegg (2012). ‘The effects of global knowledge reservoirs on the 
productivity of multinational enterprises: The role of international depth and breadth’. Research Poli-
cy, 41, pp: 848-861. 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu (2000). ‘The future of business groups in emerging markets: long-run evi-
dence from Chile’, Academy of Management Journal, 43, pp: 268–285. 
Khanna, T., K. G. Palepu and J. Sinha (2005). ‘Strategies that fit emerging markets’, Harvard Busi-
ness Review, 83, pp: 6–15.  
Khanna, T., and J. Rivkin (2001). ‘Estimating the performance of business groups in emerging mar-
kets’, Strategic Management Journal, 22, pp: 45–74. 
Kostova, T., K. Roth and T. Dacin (2008). ‘Institutional theory in the study of MNCs: A critique and 
new directions’, Academy of Management Review, 33, pp: 994–1006. 
Kotabe, M., S. S. Srinivasan and P. S. Aulakh (2002). ‘Multinationality and firm performance: the 
moderating role of RandD and marketing capabilities’, Journal of International Business Studies, 33, 
pp: 79–97. 
Krasnikov, A. and S. Jayachandran (2008). ‘The relative impact of marketing, re-




Kumar, R. and V. Worm (2004). ‘Process ambiguities in Sino-Western negotiations’, Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies, 18, pp: 5-22. 
Li, K., H. Yue and L, Zhao (2009). ‘Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from 
China’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 37, pp: 471-490. 
Li, S., S. H. Park and S. Li (2004). ‘The great leap forward: the transition from relation-based gov-
ernance to rule-based governance’, Organizational Dynamics, 33, pp: 63–78. 
Lu, J. and Z. Tao (2009). ‘Trends and determinants of China’s industrial agglomeration’, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 65, pp: 167–180.  
Luk, C. L., O. H. M. Yau, L. Y. M. Sin, A. C. B. Tse, R. P. M. Chow and J. S. Y. Lee (2008). ‘The 
effects of social capital and organizational innovativeness in different institutional contexts’, Journal 
of International Business Studies, 39, pp: 589-612. 
Luo, Y., Q. Xue and B. Han (2010). ‘How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: Ex-
perience from China’, Journal of World Business, 45, pp: 68–79. 
Ma, X., T. W. Tong and M. Fitza (2013). ‘How much does submational region matter to foreign sub-
sidiary performance? Evidence from Fortune Global 500 corporations’ investment in China’, Journal 
of International Business Studies, 44, 66-87. 
Mahmood, I. P. and C. Rufin (2005). ‘Government’s dilemma: The role of government in imitation 
and innovation’, Academy of Management Review, 30, pp: 338–360. 
Malik, O.R. and M. Kotabe (2009). ‘Dynamic capabilities, government policies, and performance in 
ﬁrms from emerging economies: Evidence from India and Pakistan’, Journal of Management Studies, 
46, pp: 421–450. 
37 
 
Meyer, K., and H. V. Nguyen (2005). ‘Foreign investment strategies and sub-national institutions in 
emerging market: Evidence from Vietnam’, Journal of Management Studies, 42, pp: 63–93. 
Meyer, K. E. and M.W. Peng (2005). ‘Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: transac-
tions, resources, and institutions’, Journal of International Business Studies, 36, pp: 600–621. 
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004, 2005, 2007), ‘The Country and Indus-
try’s Oriented List of Outward Foreign Direct Investment’, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bi/200407/20040700252005.html. 
Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Development and Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, General Administration of Customs, State Taxation Administration, and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchanges (2006). ‘Industrial Policy to Guide Outward Foreign Direct In-
vestment’ (No.[2006]1312), http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/b/2006-07-05/35669.shtml. 
Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and State Development and Reform Commission 
(2011). ‘The Country and Industry’s Guide of Outward Foreign Direct Investment’ (No. [2011]767), 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201109/20110907731370.html. 
Morgan, N. A., D. W. Vorhies and C. H. Mason (2009). ‘Market orientation, marketing capabilities, 
and firm performance’, Strategic Management Journal, 30, pp: 909-920. 
Moorman, C. and R.J. Slotegraaf (1999) ‘The contingency value of complementary capabilities in 
product development’, Journal of Marketing Research, 36, pp: 239–257. 
Nee, V. (1992). ‘Organizational dynamics of market transition: Hybrid form, property rights and 
mixed economy in China’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, pp:1–27. 
38 
 
NERI (2001). NERI index of marketization of China’s Provinces 2000, National Economic Research 
Institute, Economic Science Press, Beijing. 
Neter, J., W. Wasserman and M. H. Kutner (1985). Applied linear statistical models, Homewood, IL: 
Irwin. 
Oliver, C. (1997). ‘Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and resource-based 
views’, Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp: 697−713.  
Peng, M.W. and Y. Luo (2000). ‘Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The 
nature of a micro-macro link’, Academy of Management Journal, 43, pp: 486–501.  
Peng, M. W., D. Y. L. Wang and Y. Jiang (2008). ‘An institution-based view of international business 
strategy: A focus on emerging economies’, Journal of International Business Studies, 39, pp: 
920–936.  
Peteraf, M. A. (1993). ‘The cornerstones of competitive advantage: a resource-based view’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 14, pp: 179–191. 
Pfeffer, J. and G. R. Salancik (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective, New York: Harper and Row. 
Ramasamy, B., M. Yeung and S. Laforet (2012). ‘China’s outward foreign direct investment: Loca-
tion choice and firm ownership’, Journal of World Business, 47, pp: 17–25. 
Reed, R. and R. J. Defillipi (1990). ‘Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competi-
tive advantage’, Academy of Management Review, 15, pp: 88–102. 
39 
 
Rugman, A.M. and A. Verbeke (1992). ‘A  note  on  the  transnational  solution  and  the 
transaction  cost  theory  of  multinational  strategic  management’, Journal  of  Internation-
al  Business  Studies,  23,  pp: 237-250. 
Scott, W. R. (1995). Institutions and organizations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
Simonin, B. L. (1999). ‘Transfer of marketing know-how in international strategic alliances: An em-
pirical investigation of the role and antecedents of knowledge ambiguity’, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 30, pp: 463–90. 
Sun, P., K. Mellahi and E. Thun (2010). ‘The dynamic value of MNE political embeddedness: The 
case of the Chinese automobile industry’, Journal of International Business Studies, 41, pp: 
1161–1182. 
Tabachnick, B. G. and L. S. Fidell (2001). Using multivariate statistics, 4th ed. Needham Heights, 
MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Tseng, C., Tansuhaj, P., Hallagan, W. and J. McCullough (2007). ‘Effects of firm resources on growth 
in multinationality’, Journal of International Business Studies, 38, pp: 961-974.  
Wang, C., J. Hong, M. Kafouros and A. Boateng (2012a). ‘What Drives the Internationalization of 
Chinese Firms? Testing the Explanatory Power of Three Theoretical Frameworks’, International 
Business Review, 21, pp: 426-438.  
Wang, C., J. Hong, M. Kafouros, and M. Wright (2012b). ‘Exploring the role of government in-
volvement in outward direct investment from emerging economies’, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 43, pp: 655–676.  
40 
 
Wei, Z. and R. Hao (2010). ‘Fundamental causes of inland–coastal income inequality in post-reform 
China’, The Annals of Regional Science, 45, pp: 181–206.  
White, H. (1980). ‘A heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroscedasticity’, Econometrica, 48, pp: 817–38.  
Winter, S. G. (2003). ‘Understanding dynamic capabilities’, Strategic Management Journal, 24, pp: 
991–995.  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. The 4th Edition, 
South-Western.  
World Investment Report (WIR). (2008). Transnational corporations and infrastructure challenge. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD). 
Wright, M., I. Filatotchev and R.E. Hoskisson (2005). ‘Strategy research in emerging economies: 
Challenging the conventional wisdom – Introduction’, Journal of Management Studies, 42, pp: 1-33. 
Yaprak, A. and B. Karademir (2010). ‘The internationalization of emerging market business groups: 
an integrated literature review’, International Marketing Review, 27, pp: 245-262. 
Yeung, H. W. and W. Liu (2008). ‘Globalizing China: The rise of mainland firms in the global 
economy’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 49, pp: 57-86.Yiu, D. W., C. M. Lau and G. D. Bru-
ton (2007). ‘International venturing by emerging economy firms: The effects of firm capabilities, 
home country networks, and corporate entrepreneurship’, Journal of International Business Studies, 
38, pp: 519–540. 
Zhang, J., C. Zhou and H. Ebbers (2011). ‘Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: Institutional 




























- Firm size 
- Firm age 
- Group affiliation 
- Foreign ownership 
- Export intensity 
- Human resources 
- Industry effects 






















Figure 2 (a): Interaction effects of region-specific 
marketization and state ownership 
 
Figure 3 (b): Interaction effects of indus-
try-specific policy and state ownership  
 
Figure 2 (c): Interaction effects of marketing 
 
resources and state ownership 
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             Table 1. Correlation matrix of independent variables 
  Mean S.D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Firm size 6.12 1.49 0.45 0.42 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.28 -0.09 0.11 
2 Firm age 11.77 12.83 1.00 0.22 -0.11 -0.14 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.29 -0.15 -0.02 
3 Business group 0.16 0.37  1.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.21 -0.08 0.08 
4 Foreign ownership 0.10 0.26   1.00 0.18 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.04 
5 Export intensity 0.35 0.38    1.00 -0.15 -0.02 0.05 -0.17 0.31 -0.00 
6. Human resources 0.23 0.59     1.00 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.05 
7 Tech, resources 57.05 389.04      1.00 0.54 0.06 0.04 0.03 
8 Marketing resources 5246 50453       1.00 -0.00 0.04 0.04 
9 State ownership 0.06 0.21        1.00 -0.21 0.04 
10 Location-specific marketization 8.65 1.52         1.00 0.06 











              Table 2. Regression Results: The effects of contingencies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variables         
Firm size 5.909*** 5.779*** 12.13*** 10.434*** 11.98*** 12.107*** 10.778*** 9.509** 
Firm age 0.800*** 0.804*** 0.576** 0.413 0.588** 0.571** 0.615** 0.508* 
Business group affiliation 20.310** 21.377** 15.810* 14.574* 15.005* 15.910* 10.452 9.020 
Foreign ownership -10.017 -9.96 -13.155 -14.164 -12.945 -13.180 -13.328 -13.863 
Export intensity 0.112 -0.810 -4.284 -5.300 -4.752 -4.248 -6.304 -7.393 
Human resource 3.450 3.614 1.741 2.061 1.721 1.685 1.131 1.381 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm capabilities         
Technological resources  -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
Marketing resources  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001 
Institutional variables         
State ownership    3.361** 32.085*** 0.381 3.515** -1.595 16.817** 
Location-specific marketization   0.321 0.969 0.532 0.321 0.876 1.518* 
Industry-specific Policy   17.222** 12.369* 13.067* 17.206** 15.475** 8.251 
Interactions         
State ownership*Location-specific market-    -3.785***    -2.758*** 
State ownership*Industry-specific policy     5.968**   5.398* 
State ownership*Technological re-      -0.009  0.0002 
State ownership*Marketing resources (H3b)       0.001*** 0.001*** 
N 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 
F-statistic 4.02*** 3.64*** 3.70*** 4.72*** 3.52*** 3.52*** 7.50*** 7.54*** 
R2 0.090 0.092 0.109 0.141 0.109 0.109 0.207 0.231 
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.067 0.080 0.111 0.078 0.078 0.179 0.201 








Table 3. Exclusion restriction test  
 Coefficients T values 
Product technology resources (2004) -3.58×10-6 -0.83 
Product marketing resources (2004) 4.04×10-6 1.44 
State ownership (2004) -6.06 -0.34 
F-statistic 0.90 
R2 0.0052 










                                               
1 Large overseas investment projects need to be reported to the Ministry of Commerce directly. 
2 The dataset does not allow us to discriminate between different modes of entry by Chinese firms (Greenfield vs acquisition). 
3 This index has been adopted by many studies (e.g. Du, Lu and Tao, 2008; Firth, Lin, Liu and Wong, 2009; Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009). 
4 The document entitled ‘Industrial Policy to Guide Outward Foreign Direct Investment’ (No. [2006]1312 ) was issued jointly by China’s Ministry of Commerce, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, State Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, General Administration of Customs, State Taxation Administration, and State Admin-
istration of Foreign Exchanges in 2006. This official document lists ‘encouraged industries’ and ‘prohibited Industries’ with respect to Chinese firms’ OFDI. There are two 
other similar official documents. Firstly, ‘The Country and Industry List of OFDI’ was issued jointly by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2004, 2005 and 2007. These documents list the preferred industries for OFDI in each foreign country. The second relevant document is entitled ‘The Country and Industry 
Guide of FDI" (No. [2011]767). This was issued jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and State Development and Reform Commission in 
2011. This document discusses the business environment and opportunities for the key industries in 115 countries. It aims to provide useful information to Chinese firms that 
plan to invest overseas. 
5 According to the State Administration for Industry & Commerce business groups should have at least five affiliated companies with assets over 100 million RMB (approx. 
US$ 12 million). 
6 As China did not conduct industrial census before 2004, data for previous years are not available. 
 
 
